Answering Questions on Mutual Intelligibility & Coherence

Article Overview

Mir H. S. Quadri's article delves into the intricate relationship between mutual intelligibility and coherence, building upon his previous work questioning intelligence's self-definitional capabilities. This piece addresses ten key questions from readers, categorized into the foundations of the argument, perception, self-definition, and broader implications. Quadri aims to clarify his understanding of coherence, agentic intelligence, and the universe's inherent intelligibility.

The discussion begins by tackling the perceived circularity in defining understanding as coherence rooted in conceptualization. Quadri differentiates his view from contemporary epistemic definitions, proposing a hierarchical dependency where conceptualization is a prerequisite for coherence, not its equivalent. He uses quantum physics as an example to illustrate that conceptualization does not automatically lead to understanding or coherence.

The article then explores the metaphysical implications of inherent intelligibility, arguing that it is not an assumption but an understanding derived from the active role of intelligent agents as discoverers. Quadri addresses the Homunculus fallacy in relation to qualia, defining it as an 'experience' of coherence rather than a self-referential entity. He also examines how multiple conceptualizations of an object, like a coffee mug, contribute to a synthesized understanding, emphasizing that coherence requires both an intelligent agent and an intelligible system.

Finally, Quadri confronts criticisms regarding the application of Gödel's incompleteness theorems to intelligence and the notion of intelligence as a 'closed and internally consistent system.' He clarifies that this hypothesis pertains to intelligence at the level of coherence, not as a formal, algorithmic system. He also defends his two-part requirement for coherence against phenomena like hallucinations and dreams, asserting that even these are rooted in sensory experiences derived from an inherently intelligible environment, thus not undermining his core argument.